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Abstract 
 
Fictional and non-fictional texts rely on the same language to express their 
meaning; yet many philosophers in the analytic tradition would say, with 
reason, that fictional texts literally make no truth claims, or more modestly 
that the rhetorical and literary devices (e.g., metaphor) to which fiction and 
non-fiction writers alike have recourse are unconnected to truth or have no 
propositional content. These related views are associated with a doctrine in 
the philosophy of language, most notably advanced by the late Donald 
Davidson, which holds that we understand the semantic structure of a 
language by applying to it a theory of truth, which involves discovering the 
truth conditions of its sentences. This approach to semantic theory raises 
several seemingly intractable problems, such as the problem of stating the 
meaning of non-declarative sentences, e.g. questions and imperatives. The 
chief aim of this paper will be to try to dispel these problems by suggesting an 
adjustment in Davidson’s account of the relation of truth to meaning, one 
which will also allow us to picture such troublesome linguistic items as 
metaphor within a semantic theory, and to expand the range of objects which 
can be brought into a general theory of meaning. 
 
The truth-theory approach to meaning 
 
Donald Davidson’s effort to develop a truth-theoretic account of the semantic structure of 
language has been widely recognised, within the analytic tradition, as the leading 
example of this kind of approach to semantic theory. It was clear to Davidson, however, 
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starting with his 1967 paper “Truth and Meaning,” that a truth-theoretic approach to 
meaning faces sizable and far-reaching problems.
1
 These include the problem of 
providing an account of the meaning of non-declarative sentences, and, less of a concern 
for many analytic philosophers, of accounting for figurative and metaphorical uses of 
language, and of fictional meaning in general. This paper proposes an adjustment of the 
role that truth plays in a truth-based semantic theory, with a view to avoiding the 
seemingly intractable problems which Davidson’s theory has raised, and to widening the 
range of objects which can be brought within such a theory. 
 
The intimate relationship between language and reality suggests an attractive general 
method for philosophers who regard the task of explicating the semantics of a natural 
language as requiring a description of its truth conditions. In “Truth and Meaning” 
Davidson committed himself to the view that the only available procedure for providing 
such a description lay in a Tarski-styled truth theory.
2
 This procedure might be as simple 
as placing an object sentence in quotation marks and then stating that this sentence 
would, and only could, be true relative to some true, perhaps grammatically equivalent, 
sentence outside quotation marks. We might, for example, say that the sentence ‘Snow is 
white’ is true if and only if snow is (actually) white. Such a procedure does not establish a 
direct, non-linguistic link between the declarative sentence ‘Snow is white’, presented 
within quotation marks, and the reality to which a corresponding sentence outside 
quotation marks refers. Indeed Davidson, in early and later writings, explicitly rejected 
the idea of a non-linguistic, “unprocessed” relation between reality and our thoughts or 
descriptions of reality.
3
 The intent of the procedure, more modestly, is to use language to 
offer a description of the relevant features of reality, in order to be able to fix the 
                                               
1
 Davidson (1984 [1967]), pp. 35-6.   
2
 Ibid, p. 35. 
3
 For example: “Seeing Through Language” (1997), p. 15. 
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propositional content and so meaning of the sentence in quotation marks; and ultimately, 
were a systematic semantic analysis to be achieved, of the entire natural language to 
which the sentence belongs.  Within Davidson’s project, showing the semantic pattern of 
a natural language would thus involve specifying the propositional content of sentences 
within that language that take a truth value. From the project’s inception, however, even 
though this is part of the project which never succeeded, Davidson’s intent was to say 
how a semantic theory can show how other parts of language and how sentences which 
are non-propositional also become part of this general pattern.  
 
A decisive obstacle facing the truth-theory approach might involve the very ambition of 
establishing a formal semantics or general meaning for a natural language. The ambition 
is slightly odd for Davidson to have maintained, given the transient nature of the semantic 
criteria that his theory permitted, for example in his proposal of a passing language or a 
language that two speakers who don’t share the conventions of a common language might 
temporarily construct in order to communicate. But as Davidson makes clear in a late 
online discussion with Richard Rorty,
4
 while his ambition might not have been as grand 
as some interpreters have supposed, it did retain this commitment: that some semantic 
pattern must exist for linguistic communication to occur. In that discussion it also 
becomes clear that he retained his view that, if two speakers are to understand what the 
other is saying, the pattern in question needs to entail a common truth theory, an 
understanding of what it means to assert or deny a range of propositions as extensive as 
their mutual understanding.   
 
                                               
4
 “The Rorty Discussion,” Google links, 2008. 
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To this extent, Davidson’s account of linguistic understanding is difficult to resist.  But it 
is also limited, in so far as it assumes that a passing language in which speakers 
understand what the other is saying must convey propositional attitudes or claims. That 
assumption might seem plausible, since it seems strange to envision a situation in which 
linguistic communication takes place without assertions at least being suggested. We can 
of course imagine scenarios of lopsided communication, where, for example, the speakers 
have been instructed to confine their exchanges to questions and requests. In these 
situations, it seems natural to assume that assertions are lurking beneath the surface, if 
only because we would expect the recipient of the questions or requests, if she 
understands the language being spoken, to be able to formulate an approximate theory of 
what was being said, simply to show that she understands the questions or requests; and 
such a theory can only be represented through a series of assertions. But unlike the 
Tarski-styled truth theories which, in Davidson’s view, we need to invoke to explicate 
sentences that have a propositional content, the theory that we expect of the recipient in 
such a situation attaches truth to a description of the speech she understands, not to the 
speech, let us say set apart in quotation marks, which her description is intended to 
explicate, since that speech consists entirely of questions and requests. Her test of 
linguistic competence, then, involves primarily an application of truth to her 
interpretation (description) of the meaning of an utterance or a text – an utterance which 
may or may not be asserting a truth – and only secondarily, and not in every instance, an 
application of truth to the utterance itself.   
 
This characterisation of her linguistic competence, of her capacity to discern a semantic 
pattern in the utterances she seeks to understand, adjusts Davidson’s semantic theory by 
shifting the application of a truth theory away from meaning per se, whatever purportedly 
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is meaningful, to the interpretations which ascribe meaning.  The adjustment raises 
several issues. If we follow Davidson’s approach, we can’t speak of meaning without a 
truth theory. Against this view, the adjustment we have in mind assumes that the 
relationship between (true) interpretations and (propositional) meaning cannot 
categorically be one of equivalence, which Davidson’s use of a Tarski-styled truth 
formula, at least in paradigmatic instances, seems to require. Another issue concerns the 
main purpose of an interpretation versus the purposes of the text or utterance to which it 
ascribes meaning. While interpretations are designed to illuminate the meaning of a 
particular utterance or text in relation to a wider semantic pattern, or ‘language’ in 
Davidson’s sense of the term, the intended meaning of a great many utterances and texts 
is unrelated to this task. Further, there is this difference between meaning and 
interpretation: While an utterance or text might express its meaning in a few words, an 
interpretation that describes that meaning in relation to a language and context is liable to 
be of encyclopaedic length. 
 
Fiction and indeterminacy:  the problem of metaphorical meaning 
 
We can see a difference between interpretation and meaning that goes to the heart of 
Davidson’s commitment to a truth theory when we consider fictional texts. Fiction, after 
all, presents an arena of meaning that is fundamentally non-propositional, as fictional 
texts offer no explicit truths, only suggestions of truths and a mimetic engagement with 
reality, unless we can find a way to collapse the contexts that inform the declarative 
sentences of fictional contexts into real-world contexts. Davidson’s discussion of 
metaphor inadvertently points toward this implication. In his landmark essay “What 
Metaphors Mean” (1978), Davidson concluded that all metaphors are literally 
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meaningless. His reasons for asserting this bold conclusion suggest a tension between his 
view that a formal semantics reveals a semantic pattern that enables communication and 
his ideas of radical interpretation and linguistic indeterminacy. If ongoing interpretation 
rather than semantic convention is primary in deciding the meaning of sentences, the fact 
that what metaphorical sentences suggest or draw our attention to requires us at some 
point in our interpretation to reject the literal conventional sense of their words would not 
seem to raise a worry. The problem, however, as Davidson emphasises, is that “there is 
no limit” to the content that metaphors can suggest.5 When a radical interpreter faces an 
unusual or unclear use of words in a sentence, she can only make sense of them if she 
assigns them to a larger pattern which fixes their meaning. On Davidson’s account, non-
metaphorical declarative sentences are indeterminate only in a limited sense. Their 
meaning depends on a specific assignment of meaning, provided by an interpretation 
which places them in some language, which makes them true relative to that language. 
Without an assignment that fixes the meaning of an indeterminate sentence, thus 
rendering it determinate relative to some language, linguistic communication on 
Davidson’s account is impossible. By contrast metaphors by their very nature resist being 
fixed in this way, being confined to a single interpretation of their propositional content, 
and thus are incapable of communicating any content directly. They can of course, as 
Davidson accepts, suggest a great many truths; but they state none and so are without 
propositional content, and therefore on his account without meaning.   
 
That conclusion might follow, but only if we reject Davidson’s wider semantic 
commitment to an indeterminist view of what it means to speak a language. In particular 
we would need to reject the basis of his challenge, issued in “On the Very Idea of a 
                                               
5
 Davidson (1984 [1978]), 263. 
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Conceptual Scheme” (1974), to the assumption that a language, in so far as it is 
conceived as what grounds actual communication, has fixed semantic boundaries. What 
Davidson’s worry about the limitless semantic potential of metaphors seems to downplay 
or ignore is his view of the indeterminate nature of the thing which ultimately grounds all 
communication, namely language, conceived not primarily as a set of semantic 
conventions but as a locus of ongoing semantic adjustment through interpretation. 
Davidson’s strategy in “What Metaphors Mean” is to sever the link between metaphor 
and truth, and thus between metaphor and meaning, by pointing to the fact that metaphors 
do not state truths. This strategy relies on the assumption that we have brought into 
question, namely that interpretation and meaning, in paradigm cases of interpretation, are 
approximately equivalent, and that meaning reduces to a fixed propositional content. 
Davidson is right to say that metaphors suggest many things rather than state specific 
truths, a claim which might be taken to mean that our interpretation of a metaphor will be 
an ongoing affair and not come to an end; but Davidson’s view is that interpretation can 
make no headway, discern no meaning, since it would be difficult or impossible to raise a 
consistent language to which we might make relative the various contrary truths that we 
would ascribe to the metaphor.  Maintaining a consistent language in Davidson’s solution 
becomes an important ideal. The more seriously we take this idea, however, the more we 
seem to be interfering with his view that the idea of a language as a fixed shared structure 
plays no essential role in explaining actual linguistic communication.   
 
The problem of contradictory interpretations 
 
Metaphors play havoc with any semantic structure, whether conceived as a set of 
semantic conventions or as a temporarily constructed passing language. But so, too, do 
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such unremarkable looking sentences as these: ‘The bachelors here are unmarried’ and 
‘The bachelors here are bachelors.’ If we interpret these sentences according to the 
semantic conventions of English, they would seem to be saying the same thing. But even 
if we preserve the conventions of English, we may have doubts. If we’re impressed by 
Quine’s famous discussion of synonymy in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” we may doubt 
whether both sentences express tautologies;
6
 and if we wonder whether ‘bachelor’ draws 
on the same convention each time it occurs in the second sentence, we may take the view 
that neither sentence is a tautology. Further, it could be that the sentence flies in the face 
of convention, or that the convention is undecided; considering the latter possibility, we 
may wonder, for instance, whether, according to convention, widowers and divorced men 
should count as bachelors, which might turn into a doubt about whether our existing 
dictionaries capture the convention correctly.   
 
Should we conclude that the sentence is meaningless until we can stipulate a single and 
exclusive meaning? Davidson seems to be committed to this constraint when he resists 
the idea of metaphorical meaning on account of our inability to assign a single truth-
theory to a metaphor. By contrast, he would allow that the sentence ‘The bachelors here 
are bachelors’ is meaningful, even though it might have inconsistent meanings, provided 
that we specify each meaning. Using his procedure of stating the propositional content of 
each meaning, we might unfortunately end by having the sentence, on the basis of our 
best evidence of the speaker’s behaviour, represent contradictory truths. Davidson dealt 
quite neatly with this problem in “The Inscrutability of Reference” (1979). His solution 
there was to dispel the assumption that the sentence belongs to “a unique language,”7 and 
then to suggest that we can specify the language in relation to which each interpretation is 
                                               
6
 Quine (1980 [1951]), pp. 27-32. 
7
 Davidson (1984 [1979]), p. 239. 
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true. Alternative interpretations would thus entail different languages; and a single 
sentence could thereby represent different propositions.   
 
Normally when we disambiguate in this way, we have in mind a single language which 
happens to contain, as natural languages do and as a passing language might, alternative 
meanings for words. By referring to different languages in his solution to the problem of 
consistency posed by an inscrutable utterance, as opposed to a language without set 
boundaries, Davidson seems to be concerned to fix categorically the language relative to 
which the sentence considered under alternative interpretations is true. But that solution 
isn’t coherently available to Davidson. The very idea of a constraint which proliferates 
languages begins to resemble the mistake to which he believes we are committed when 
we picture a language as essentially an established system that we share in advance of 
communication. Perhaps Davidson’s solution could be reinforced by invoking his idea of 
a passing language or non-conventional shared structure, to allow for indeterminacy at 
the level of grammatical appearance – where we face a sentence that does not belong to 
“a unique language” – and to ensure determinate literal meaning at the level at which 
language actually communicates.
8
 But how strenuously should we preserve the idea of 
distinct languages, whether conceived as conventional or passing languages, or more 
realistically as hybrid languages, i.e., heavily conventional languages which are 
continually being adjusted or passing languages which for fairly obvious reasons draw 
heavily on convention? Conceiving of a passing language as a temporary semantic 
pattern that permits communication to pass between speakers who do not share any 
linguistic conventions at the outset suggests, for practical reasons, a rather limited 
language, whereas the idea of a passing language that changes or develops semantic 
                                               
8
 Davidson presents his idea of a passing language and rejects the view of language as essentially 
conventional in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (1986).   
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conventions would seem, for contingent reasons, to conform more readily to the semantic 
patterns that actually allow communication to take place. But either way, there is no need 
to assume a distinct language in the face of an ambiguous sentence that suggests, prior to 
disambiguation, contradictory interpretations. Unless the intent of Davidson’s solution is 
that we must view passing languages as wholly distinct, there is no need to reject the 
assumption of a unique language, or to accept it; the concern either way seems to be 
bound to a view of language that Davidson explicitly rejects.
9
 
 
A more economical solution is available. Instead of having the same sentence, by virtue 
of being ambiguous in respect of propositional content, belong to more than one 
language, we simply observe that using the resources of language we can perform many 
marvellous tasks, including the task of saying different things across varying contexts 
with the same words, or roughly the same things using different words. When raising 
different contexts, we are not continually speaking different languages but drawing on 
and continually altering language.  
 
Language and the incompleteness of interpretation 
 
The limitless proliferation of meaning which Davidson gives as a reason to withhold 
meaning from metaphors should similarly prevent interpretations from assigning meaning 
to a declarative sentence that purportedly bears a truth value. For there is no way to know 
the limits of what we might have such a sentence mean, unless we can predict how 
innovatively or routinely the language in which it figures will be spoken.  The rest of the 
speaker’s linguistic behaviour might over time shed light on what she intended to 
                                               
9
 E.g., in Davidson (1984), p. 198. 
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communicate at a particular moment, but unless we invoke the idea of a language with 
definite semantic boundaries, we are not in a position to prevent an expansion of the 
sentence’s meaning. The sentence might develop a semantic history, to which the speaker 
and other language users alike may contribute. Metaphors, in so far as they remain alive, 
encourage such an expansion, but no sentence, regardless of the intent of its speaker, can 
remain safe from an expansion of its meaning if it belongs to an actual language and 
attracts the interest of interpreters over time. The only way, seemingly, to fix a sentence 
categorically is to fix the semantic pattern or language in which it has meaning. But 
again, Davidson cannot accept that solution, short of rejecting his own view of a 
language. 
 
Davidson is concerned that “much of what we are caused [by metaphors] to notice is not 
propositional in character.”10 Of course what any sentence might cause us to notice could 
be non-propositional. But the point which Davidson is suggesting is unavoidable: 
Metaphorical meaning, if we allow the  hypothesis that metaphors have meaning, is not 
propositional, at least not directly so; a metaphor might, as Davidson says, suggest many 
truths, but it doesn’t state any. Even the putatively literal reading of a metaphorical 
sentence, such as ‘Achilles is a lion,’ only has a propositional content if we fail to 
recognise that the sentence is a metaphor, or if the sentence is asserted in a context in 
which it refers to a lion rather than to the fictional character or figure of legend named 
‘Achilles.’ An interpretation which describes the sentence as metaphorical should not end 
by affirming the view that Achilles might actually be a lion but instead provide a 
description of the relationships that the metaphor suggests.  Since these relationships can 
continue to expand, the interpretation will be incomplete.  But that is hardly surprising. 
                                               
10
 Davidson (1984 [1978]), p. 263. 
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We expect the meaning of metaphors to remain open, and so never to be completely 
described. 
 
Davidson is right to emphasise that metaphors do not state propositions on another count. 
At one point in his discussion he offers and quickly dismisses the proposal that we could 
provide a propositional content for a metaphorical sentence by taking a truth that it 
suggests to us and imposing it on the sentence.
11
 By radically adjusting the sense of the 
words of the sentence we might be able to do just that; but then we would not be left with 
a metaphor but a single assertion with a single sense. For as soon as we give the sentence 
a propositional content, we must also give it the logical form of a proposition, a form 
which implies a single truth value.  
 
This requirement points to an important division between propositional language and 
figurative uses of language, in which we would include not only all metaphors but all 
fiction. Whereas the meaning of a proposition can be expressed by any number of 
declarative sentences – with the only constraint being that the new expression retain the 
truth value of the expression it translates, along with all the logical relations of the 
translated expression to all possible propositions – the meaning of figurative uses of 
language tends to be bound to the particular words in which it is expressed. Further, if the 
figurative expression occurs in a fictional work, then the task of translating the particular 
words becomes more exacting, since their meaning is confined to a context that depends 
on the narrative or aesthetic structure of that unique work. In instances where the 
aesthetic significance of the words depends on unique features (their sonic value, letters, 
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a unique etymology, and so on) the words may need to be carried into translation 
unchanged, or the translator may only be able to produce an analogous result.   
 
While the meaning of particular words and sentences in a fictional work remains largely 
attached to those words, unlike the meaning by which a sentence expresses a proposition, 
the meaning produced by those words, unlike propositional meaning, is indeterminate. 
This difference between figurative and propositional uses of language points to a division 
in the linguistic indeterminacy thesis, at least if we accept the following characterisation 
of how the thesis applies: In the case of propositional language, the linguistic appearance 
of a sentence used to express a proposition is indeterminate, but the propositional 
meaning of that sentence is fixed; in the case of fiction, its meaning is indeterminate, i.e. 
no interpretation fixes its (developing) meaning.   
 
It might seem odd to speak of meaning which is not definite. But this oddness may point 
to another problem with collapsing interpretation into meaning. In the case of metaphor, 
insisting on a definite meaning clearly threatens our logical scruples if we collapse 
interpretation into meaning. Consider again ‘Achilles is a lion.’ We might take that 
sentence to mean that Achilles is a lion and is not a lion, assuming that we want to 
maintain the tension which the metaphor suggests – if we agree with Davidson that the 
sentence does not reduce to the vague proposition that Achilles is merely like a lion.
12
 
The definite claims that we can make about the sentence readily lead to a contradiction, 
and so to an incoherent interpretation. On at least one reading that outcome seems 
inevitable. But this way of thinking about the relation between interpretation and 
meaning, in which interpretations are thought to assign truth values and thereby to 
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establish meaning, misses the temporal and dynamic nature of much non-propositional 
meaning. A more plausible interpretation would describe Achilles’ apparent 
transformation into a lion as suggestive of a tension, not as a literal conflation of 
reference that establishes a contradiction, and would retain that suggestion of a tension all 
the way through an ongoing description of what the metaphor begins to draw our 
attention to.   
 
This alternative way of thinking about metaphor is consistent with Davidson’s theory. In 
considering the suggestive capacity of language, though, we need not follow his view that 
metaphors are causal, that they merely cause us to think of various things the way “a 
bump on the head” might.13 In line with Davidson’s general outlook on meaning, it would 
be clearer to say that we interpret the metaphor to be maintaining a mimetic, playful 
relationship between our messy, open-ended, and yet in many ways quite specific idea of 
lions and the messy, open-ended, and yet in many ways quite specific qualities embodied 
in the ideal of a man represented by the fictional or legendary figure named ‘Achilles.’ 
But whereas our interpretation is a definite description, and therefore propositional, the 
meaning which it describes has no propositional content; it draws exclusively from 
fictional contexts which only mimetically and indefinitely engage qualities whose 
references derive from a real-world context. 
 
This distinction turns on our adjustment of Davidson’s semantic theory, by not collapsing 
interpretation into meaning and by rejecting an essential connection between meaning 
and truth relegated to a truth-theory. Truth is still indispensable in the sense implied by 
the view that an interpretive description of meaning is propositional. But its propositional 
                                               
13
 Ibid. p. 262.  
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content is distinct from the content/meaning of what it describes, because it relates not 
only the parts of what we find meaningful to a whole, but also relates that meaningful 
whole to a wider, never finished semantic pattern, a language in Davidson’s sense. Truth 
plays an essential role in this wider description, but not in the way pictured by 
Davidson’s use of a Tarski-styled truth formula. Even when a description of meaning 
assigns propositional content to a sentence, the wider description of that sentence’s 
meaning remains an incomplete project, in so far as it picks out the sentence’s relations to 
a language. The wider description of a sentence’s meaning is thus not equivalent to the 
propositional content of the sentence, which is always definite and complete, regardless 
of whether the sentence used to express this content serves other semantic purposes. Even 
in the case of a purely analytic sentence, the wider semantic project required to explicate 
its semantic structure would need to include a theory of how a sizable number of signs 
relate to other signs, including various logical and grammatical signs, whereas the 
sentence itself draws on but doesn’t state any of these relations when expressing its 
propositional content. 
 
In the case of fictional sentences, the situation resembles the special case of metaphor, in 
that none of the sentences of a fictional work are propositional. Instead they represent 
truths through the complex mimetic relations of a fictional context, and are themselves 
issued through the fictional device of narrative or character voice. In some instances, it 
might seem perverse to withhold truth status from a fictional sentence, when its mimetic 
context draws straightforwardly on real-world references, and when the sentence would 
have a truth value were it to be uttered outside the work of fiction.  If the doctrine seems 
unpalatable in such instances, we might be tempted to hold that the meaning of many 
works of fiction shifts between outer and inner contexts, between real-world contexts and 
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those fictional contexts which mimetically engage real-world references. But this solution 
assumes that we can assign the meaning of a group of sentences within a fictional work to 
various real-world contexts without severing its interaction with the fictional context 
which supplies a different meaning, and so without cutting it off from all the narrative 
elements (of theme, voice, character, scene, mood, and so forth) conveyed by the 
sentences which draw their meaning from the fictional context. This assumption aside, 
we gain nothing semantically unique from this division of contexts, as any truth stated 
inside the work, if we can still coherently refer to meaning deriving from a real-world 
context as inside the fictional work, will be equivalent to its assertion outside the work. If 
the concern is that some truths might not occur to us without the myriad associations of 
the fictional work, then we are no longer referring to explicit propositional content. We 
have instead returned to a worry which we might similarly have over metaphor. How can 
a particular sentence (or other piece of language, or anything non-propositional) suggest 
truths which it does not literally state?   
 
Davidson’s causal theory of metaphor 
 
Davidson’s answer to this concern, as we have seen, was that a metaphor’s capacity to 
suggest various truths is wholly causal, and as such as inadvertent and adventitious as the 
relation between the same suggested truths and “a bump on the head.”14 But how can that 
be? At his rate there would be no distinction to be made between the active critical task of 
interpreting a metaphor, of assigning meaning to it on the basis of its parts in relation to 
their whole within a specific context, and in relation to our language, and passively being 
affected by it. Nor would the composition of a metaphor matter. When delving into the 
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semantic associations of ‘Achilles is a lion,’ we would stand no better chance of 
acquiring any of the insights that the metaphor might suggest than were we to turn to a 
very different sentence, for instance ‘Achilles is flock of geese.’ Instead of a critical task, 
Davidson sees the “elucidation” of metaphor as a causal task. The ‘elucidator’ in this 
idiosyncratic sense of the term doesn’t assign a meaning; rather, she provides a “so-called 
paraphrase” designed for a less “sensitive or educated reader,”15 which is intended to 
work causally on such a reader, to produce the kind of effect which the metaphor is liable 
to have, namely the effect of stimulating an insight. This solution would seem once again 
to eliminate the distinction between interpretation and causal effect, but oddly by 
invoking the idea of another insight-stimulator, whose task it would seem brings her 
precariously close to the activity of interpretation. Indeed Davidson appears to concede 
“that interpretation and elucidation” are “in order” when seeking insight from metaphor, 
even though he characterises the critic as being involved in a rather curious game of 
stimulus-response, “in benign competition with the metaphor maker,”16 or, presumably, 
with prospective head-bumpers who similarly collapse the distinction between 
interpretation and causal effect and who similarly expect by this method to produce 
insight.   
 
The idea of metaphors imparting a specific insight depends on an idea which Davidson is 
right to reject, namely that metaphors have a propositional content, an idea which 
assumes that metaphors have a determinate meaning. But that idea is curious from the 
start. Davidson might simply have pointed out that metaphors are inherently 
indeterminate, a point which he does suggest when he says that “there is no limit to what 
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 Ibid, p. 264. 
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a metaphor calls to our attention,”17 and that any sentence which is not given a 
determinate content cannot take a truth value. The issue then reverts to the plausibility of 
the wider semantic project, which categorically rejects the idea of semantic 
indeterminacy, even though indeterminacy is assumed as a kind of linguistic veneer over 
sentences and over an entire language (comprised exclusively of propositions?) before 
apparently indeterminate sentences have been delivered to their proper languages by a 
consistent theory of truth. Against this picture, our adjustment permits discovery of 
insights which a metaphor suggests to us while accepting that no metaphor, other than the 
dead sort, literally states or entails these. Truth, or as Davidson would sometimes say, 
avoidance of error, is still a constraint on interpretation, but only in the sense that an 
interpretation must be true, as opposed to the idea that an interpretation must project truth 
on to the sentence to which it ascribes meaning. Accordingly it would make sense, 
depending on context, to reject an interpretation of ‘Achilles is a lion’ which asserts that 
the sentence promotes the view that ‘Achilles’ names not one but many creatures of a 
kind, and that these creatures have wings, tend to flock together, and at times leave the 
ground in sustained flight; in short, to treat ‘is a lion’ as though it reads ‘is a flock of 
geese.’ In the case of sentences issued through narration or a character, we can take a 
similar line, perhaps at times blurring the distinction between discovery and interpretive 
recovery and invention, as seems natural to say of indeterminate meaning that unfolds 
through ongoing interpretation, and view what insights we discover as suggested by a 
semantic structure, a series of semantic relations within the entire work, to which we 
contribute. 
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The original truth-theoretic semantics and determinate meaning 
 
Semantic determinacy, even in the limited sense advanced by Davidson, is a requirement 
of truth-theory accounts of meaning that drastically reduces, in principle, the permissible 
range of meaningful sentences. This reduction extends beyond fictional and metaphorical 
sentences to the kind of sentences whose prospective meaning inspired the invention of 
the first truth-theoretic semantic approach to linguistic meaning. The moment occurred 
when Augustine, in his Confessions, faced the problem of trying to decipher the meaning 
of the perplexing and vague opening verse of Genesis – rendered from Hebrew to Latin 
by Augustine, and here to English – “In the beginning God created the heaven and the 
earth” (King James).   
 
In his lengthy discussion of this verse Augustine introduced much of the essential 
framework of a truth-theoretic semantics, including the first use of the accompanying 
principle of interpretive charity, a version of which would become the basis of 
Davidson’s model of radical interpretation. But Augustine’s use of charity in that 
discussion extended not merely to the object language and particular sentence which he 
sought to explicate; it extended to all plausible interpretations of the sentence.  While 
closely examining numerous interpretations of Genesis 1:1, Augustine explicitly 
welcomed contrary ascriptions of truth, as provisional interpretations of a sentence whose 
meaning remains, at least for human interpreters, unfixed. Under a truth-theoretic 
semantics, however, such openness risks incoherence; certainly it does when Augustine 
characterises many of the contrary interpretations he considers as true.
18
 He would avoid 
incoherence if it turns out that he anticipated Davidson’s solution of making contrary 
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ascriptions of truth to the same sentence thereby deliver the sentence into different 
languages, though given Augustine’s practice of extending charity as far as possible 
toward competing plausible interpretations, this solution would involve assigning Genesis 
1:1 to a multitude – given the obscurity of the verse, a “potential infinitude” – of 
languages, which suggests why Davidson was loath to regard metaphors as meaningful 
beyond a recovery of their literal meaning. Less extravagantly, Augustine could have 
meant that the first verse of Genesis suggests many truths but that none of these truths 
circumscribes or is equivalent to its meaning.  That more modest appraisal, however, 
would have involved giving up the (nascent) project of a truth-theoretic semantics, or – 
not an option for Augustine, nor required with our adjustment – consigning the sentence 
to an expression of nonsense.  
 
Language and content 
 
Faced with these choices, an interpretation-based semantic theory seems to waver 
between a multiple-language model (to which the need to provide a fixed propositional 
content in at least one instance committed Davidson), regardless of the issue of whether 
or not we should consign metaphor and cryptic sentences to the status of nonsense, and a 
view of meaning which doesn’t assume that a semantic structure must derive from a 
truth-theory. The model to which Davidson committed himself when offering a solution 
to the problem of contrary truth assignments backed him into a corner in which he tacitly 
assumed the idea of distinct languages; otherwise his solution to the problem of contrary 
truths assigned to the same sentence fails.  Davidson, though, as we have seen, rejects the 
view of languages or worldviews as distinct, or of language as “a clearly defined shared 
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[conventional] structure.”19 Perhaps his idea of a passing language can come to the rescue 
here, as it offers a model of communication which has no recourse to convention. We 
might, following Davidson’s solution to the problem of contrary interpretations, imagine 
two passing languages to which contrary assignments of truth to the same sentence are 
respectively relative. A passing language, though, assuming that it doesn’t become inert 
or conventionalised, presumably poses no barriers to meanings or truths which we wish 
to express in it. If that’s how we conceive of the passing languages to which the truth 
assignments are relative, it would be difficult to say that the meaning of the sentence that 
we have made equivalent to a truth assignment is determinate, since the two languages to 
which each contrary assignment of truth is relative are not distinct.  When faced with the 
challenge to the indeterminacy thesis based on contrary interpretations, we might instead 
take the view that, while the semantic relations between sentences and a language are 
endlessly variable, a sentence uttered in a certain context can take a truth value and a 
particular interpretation. If we then vary the truth value and propositional content of the 
sentence, and presumably its context, we will be in a position to consider another aspect 
of its (evolving) meaning; and another if we vary it again, as many aspects as our 
variations impose. In making these variances, instead of proliferating languages, we are 
taking seriously Davidson’s rejection of the dualism of (linguistic) scheme and content, 
which involves abandoning the idea of language as a structure with distinct and inert 
semantic boundaries, and with it the solution of shifting the same sentence into different 
languages to avoid contradiction. 
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The insufficiency of truth-theories 
 
Davidson’s solution to the indeterminacy problem only needs to be offered if we save the 
assumption of an equivalence between meaning and interpretation. We might add, in 
cases where an interpretation, conceived as a truth-theory, is not in error. This 
qualification goes to the heart of Davidson’s efforts, and in a more modest form can be 
preserved if we give up the view that interpretation of linguistic meaning entails 
projection of a truth-theory. Of course when we describe the semantic structure of a 
sentence which asserts a truth, our description will in effect assign a truth-theory. But 
doesn’t such an assignment assume a description of the words and word-relations of the 
sentence, and of the context which determines how we are using and relating these words 
in this instance? A change of context, after all, changes the meaning of the words as they 
form a sentence and so what the sentence asserts. So, a description of the semantic 
structure of a sentence which asserts a truth must include a description of word-order 
relative to a context. While that description naturally is guided in part by what we take 
the sentence to be asserting, what it asserts in turn is determined by the context which 
informs how we are to understand particular words in their relation to the whole sentence, 
and in relation to an indefinitely large number of other sentences. A description of 
meaning, then, does not reduce to a description of the sentence’s propositional content.  
 
This distinction doesn’t interfere with Davidson’s claim, in “Seeing through Language” 
(1997), that “there is no distinction between having a concept and having thoughts with 
propositional content,” 20 including presumably thoughts concerning a concept someone 
is asking us about – for example, in the question ‘Do you think “Achilles” refers to a 
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flock of geese?’ Understanding a question assumes that we have accurate thoughts about 
the content and context of the question, and presumably that ordinarily we would 
recognise the mistake of anyone who, say, treats the question as though it were a 
command or a declaration. Linguistic understanding, as Davidson stresses in “Seeing 
through Language,” requires a capacity to recognise errors of language use as errors. In 
that essay, Davidson makes no mention of the requirement of a Tarski-styled truth-
theory, and speaks instead of linguistic understanding simply as requiring a capacity to 
recognise an error in interpretation as an error.
21
 In effect, he speaks as though he 
distinguishes between the propositional content of the interpretation which represents our 
understanding of an utterance and the (perhaps non-propositional) content or meaning of 
the utterance. He doesn’t acknowledge this distinction, but none of the requirements of 
linguistic understanding which he specifies in this late essay would be undermined were 
it to be maintained. What would be gained? For one thing, we would be able to talk, 
without further explanation, of understanding non-propositional meaning, while 
preserving the constraint of truth.  We would be able to talk of the meaningfulness of 
questions and imperatives, and of being correct or mistaken about their meaning, without 
further adjustments to our semantic theory. Likewise, we would be entitled to refer to 
fictional or mimetic meaning. The only truth constraint which we will have eliminated is 
the one that rests on the dogma that tacitly eliminates a distinction between interpretation 
and meaning. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21
 Ibid. 
Praxis, Vol. 3, No. 2, Winter 2012/13  ISSN 1756-1019 
 
 24 
Non-linguistic meaning  
 
Once we eliminate this dogma, there is no obvious reason why we cannot extend a theory 
of meaning to non-linguistic items, for example, visual artworks and musical 
performances. Provided that our interpretations of the artwork or music can describe 
discernible relationships between the entire work and its parts, and we can specify 
contexts in which our interpretation could be in error (for example, when we mistakenly 
take sporadic coughing to be integrally rather than incidentally connected to a musical 
performance), then we can intelligibly speak, as we tend commonly to do, of these 
objects as meaningful, in a sense that accords with a general theory of meaning. Like 
questions, imperatives, and the sentences of fiction (and for that matter declarative 
sentences which assert truths), an artwork or piece of music says nothing by itself, 
outside a context in which recovery of meaning is possible. Beyond the minimal 
condition of context, all these semantic objects require, not a truth-theory but a theory or 
interpretation which happens to be true (relative to our language as it applies within a 
specific context which we can specify more or less exactly), to recover or elaborate their 
content.  In the case of declarative sentences which state a truth, the theory is itself true 
and it describes the sentences as having the form of a specific statement, and so in effect, 
among other things, projects a theory of truth. In the case of questions and imperatives 
which refer to real-world concepts, the theory is true but it doesn’t project truth on to the 
question or imperative to which its description assigns meaning. With mimetic objects, 
we might be tempted to say that the possibility of error recedes and with it the prospects 
for an attribution of meaning.  But less dramatically we can say that the contexts of 
recovery are more frequently varied and sometimes more difficult to specify, and 
conclude from these hermeneutic facts the banal point that some interpretive tasks remain 
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conspicuously incomplete and so present an ongoing challenge. Such (unsettled) works 
provide an exemplary instance of the fact that interpretations are provisional in at least 
these two respects:  a shift in context requires a shift in interpretation; and failure to 
specify all aspects of a (complex) context leaves an interpretation incomplete. But these 
are considerations of a practical nature; they don’t in principle rule out the possibility of 
meaning for sentences and objects whose presumed meaning is not explicit and whose 
interpretive context is not relatively straightforward.   
 
Ineffable meaning versus explicit meaning 
 
The adjustment to Davidson’s (full-blown) semantic project which this paper offers keeps 
in tact his view that truth, or avoidance of error, plays an essential role in our recovery or 
elaboration
22
 of meaning. Michael Morris raises an important challenge to this view in his 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford, 2007).  Following a criticism of 
Davidson suggested to him by Paul Davies, a colleague at Sussex University, Morris 
invokes the open-ended significance of works of art – the fact that no interpretation ever 
fully captures the significance of those “pieces of music, works of literature, paintings, 
and so on” to which we find ourselves returning “again and again” – to question the 
assumption that the situation is different in the case of “ordinary linguistic meaning,” 
which might similarly elude our ability to capture it through an “explicit statement” or 
series of statements.
23
 After raising Davies’ concern, Morris points out that “[n]o 
argument is provided for [the aforementioned] assumption, and in general it’s not 
                                               
22
 This distinction is worth maintaining, as the speaker, author, or creator of something meaningful 
presumably cannot anticipate every future context in which her utterance or creation has meaning, nor 
anticipate all the surprising relations which might occur in contexts which she does have in mind.  Further, 
we can presumably provide contexts in which we can speak of the meaning of things that are not man-
made. 
23
 Morris (2007), p. 192. 
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questioned within the analytic tradition.”24 Davies’ criticism and Morris’ suggested 
application of it beyond Davidson’s theory of language raise an important challenge to 
semantic theories within the analytic tradition, and to the present adjustment to 
Davidson’s theory. While their concern concurs with the view advanced by this paper, 
and it seems by most non-philosophers, that we can speak reasonably of the 
meaningfulness of works of art, including non-linguistic works of art, they doubt whether 
an explicit description of meaning is a necessary condition of meaning.   
 
I would agree entirely with this point of their concern. Clearly, we only rarely explicitly 
interpret the meaning of texts or objects which we regard as imparting significance of 
some kind, and perhaps we never do so completely. Nor is it likely that, if pressed, many 
of us would be able meet to the challenge of explicitly describing very far the meaning of 
even relatively simple meaningful objects, for instance, straightforwardly true declarative 
sentences. For that matter, it remains an open question whether anyone, in a tradition 
based on the development of linguistic analysis for over a hundred years and substantially 
dedicated to the task of analysis within the limited arena of declarative sentences which 
bear a truth value, typically considered within unproblematic contexts, has provided an 
adequate general theory to account for the meaning of these, let alone of the stream of 
words and sentences which comprise the less containable but perhaps no less 
representative parts of linguistic communication. My response to this elaborate concern 
brings my agreement with Davidson to a head. It is this:  that if any of our encounters 
with meaning are not illusory, they must in principle, irrespective of normal, unexamined 
practice, represent a series of semantic relations and a context which could be made 
explicit, even if in fact they never completely will be. If this response is right, then there 
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remains, after we give up the general semantic requirement of a truth-theory, an essential 
connection between meaning and truth, even in the case of fictional meaning. 
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